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Abstract  
New technologies under development, capable of inflicting pain 
on masses of people, could be used for border control against 
asylum seekers. Implementation might be rationalized by the 
threat of mass migration due to climate change, nuclear disaster 
or exaggerated fears of refugees created by governments. We 
focus on taser anti-personnel mines, suggesting both 
technological countermeasures and ways of making the use of 
such technology politically counterproductive. We also outline 
several other types of 'non-lethal' technology that could be used 
for border control and raise human rights concerns: high-
powered microwaves; armed robots; wireless tasers; acoustic 
devices/vortex rings; ionizing and pulsed energy lasers; 
chemical calmatives, convulsants, bioregulators and 
malodurants. Whether all these possible border technologies 
will be implemented is a matter for speculation, but their 
serious human rights implications warrant advance scrutiny.  
Keywords: border control; non-lethal weapons; human rights; 
backfire; asylum seekers; taser mines  
1. Introduction  
There are millions of refugees in the world, many of them 
fleeing war and persecution. Although most of these people have 
found asylum - sometimes only temporary - elsewhere in their 
own countries or in nearby countries, the refugee 'problem' has 
caused the governments of many rich countries to develop ever 
more drastic measures to prevent unauthorized entry. At the 
same time they have mobilized public opinion against refugees.  
     Corporate globalization is breaking down traditional 
societies, opening economies to foreign investment. But the free 
flow of capital is not matched by an equivalent free flow of 
labour. Global mass media present unrealistic visions of western 
affluence while governments tighten entry requirements.  
     As refugees have been demonized by western governments 
and mass media, supporters of human rights have been put on 
the defensive. Yet things could become much worse.  
A new era of sub-state warfare emerged after 11 September 
2001, in which all refugees are viewed as suspect and new 
measures are considered to hold refugees outside of the borders 
of rich countries whilst their applications are processed 
(Statewatch 2003), or to biometrically track 'asylum seekers' 
once they are inside their chosen state of refuge.  
According to Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, 
'No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.' However, within Europe, huge 'Eurodac' 
databases have been set up to fingerprint every refugee to use 
this convention so that attempts to enter one EU country are 
prevented when another EU country previously refused 
permission (SEMDOC 2002). Rapid advances in computation 
technologies using eye and face recognition will enable such 
tracking to become algorithmic and 'official non-residents' could 
be effectively barcoded and electronically branded when passing 
through external and internal gateways.  
2. A New State Security Context  
Such migrations are not happening in a vacuum. Affluent 
countries are creating advanced weapons technologies that are 
used in wars frequently leading to the displacement of civilians. 
Energy-intensive affluence is contributing to climate change 
that is already being seen in security terms because of its 
potential to rapidly generate huge numbers of refugees. Human-
induced climate change could lead to sea level rises of several 
metres. Most of the world's key centres of population are on 
seaboards and highly vulnerable to the negative impacts of 
flooding.  
From 1995, the EU has conceptualized the securitizing of the 
environment whilst lacking any influence to strategically 
integrate member states' military forces. A European Parliament 
resolution in 1999 noted that 'the number of "environmental 
refugees" now exceeds the number of "traditional refugees" (25 
million compared with 22 million)' (EU 1999: 93). Analysts such 
as Vogler (2002) have noted that whilst the EU has stopped 
short of characterizing refugees as a security threat, it has 
perceived the flow of refugees as putting 'direct pressure on EU 
immigration and justice policies.'  
Advisors to the US military have been more forthright. A secret 
report prepared for the Pentagon in 2003 and obtained by the 
media warns of catastrophic climate change leading to future 
wars being fought over the issue of survival rather than religion, 
ideology or national honour (Schwartz and Randall 2003). The 
report predicts that rich areas such as the US and Europe would 
become virtual fortresses to prevent millions of migrants from 
entering after being forced from land drowned by sea level rise 
or no longer able to grow crops, with more than 400 million 
people in sub-tropical regions at risk. They predict massive 
numbers of migrants arriving at Southern European shores 
from hard-hit Africa and mega-droughts affecting the world's 
major bread baskets, including America's midwest, where 
strong winds cause soil loss. Different regions would suffer 
disproportionately; for example, China's huge population makes 
it especially vulnerable and Bangladesh is predicted to become 
virtually uninhabitable because of rising sea levels.  
     Another source of mass human flows is political crisis or 
disaster. The explosion of just a single nuclear weapon in a city - 
for example in the Middle East or South Asia - could trigger an 
avalanche of refugees fleeing the actual explosion, fallout or the 
risk of future attacks. A serious accident at a nuclear power 
plant could have similar consequences. Such possibilities could 
lead some states to seal their borders and to deploy technologies 
to prevent crossings by civilians.  
     We do not make predictions but rather suggest that there are 
several contingencies - climate change, war, terrorist attack, 
political emergency - that could lead large numbers of people to 
flee their homes and for states to seek to seal their borders 
against masses of people seeking asylum. Furthermore, even 
without a massive increase in human migration, it is possible for 
governments to create fears about such an occurrence that could 
be used to politically justify border policing. In other words, the 
refugee 'threat' is socially constructed: there doesn't need to be a 
real issue for technology to be deployed (Pickering 2004). 
Furthermore, the very deployment of such measures creates an 
assumption that there is a security crisis and helps to legitimate 
further developments.  
3. Reframing Human Displacement Strategies 
and Options  
Schwartz and Randall (2003) concede that it may already be too 
late to prevent a disaster that becomes a unique national 
security threat because there is no obvious enemy to attack. 
However, that has not stopped US military planners treating the 
threat as deserving of a technological treatment.  
     For several decades, militaries have been pouring funds into 
developing so-called non-lethal weapons, such as plastic bullets, 
electroshock batons and pepper spray. Some of these have 
already been adopted by police, military and state security 
forces. In addition to physical equipment, the category of non-
lethal weapons includes techniques of human tracking, area 
denial, and advanced techniques of intimidation and 
interrogation, such as sensory deprivation - so-called 'torture-
lite'. These tools are already being used on an everyday basis to 
quash dissent and to restrict access (Omega 2000). Another 
generation of sub-lethal incapacitating weaponry lies in the 
wings waiting new applications. In conference proceedings of 
specialist security seminars, refugee issues are reframed from a 
matter of humanitarian assistance into a new technopolitics of 
exclusion. (For detailed discussions of advances in so-called 
non-lethal weaponry and possible future capabilities and 
options, see the Janes seminars on non-lethal weapons and the 
non-lethal weapons symposia at Ettlingen, Germany hosted by 
Fraunhofer ICT.)  
     The intersection of the growing refugee 'problem' and 
futuristic techniques of technological control gives rise to some 
frightening possibilities in the next decade or two. New 
technologies give the capacity to inflict pain on whole groups of 
people. For example, in addition to electroshock batons that are 
used against individuals, weapons are being developed by 
governments and corporations to incapacitate entire crowds, 
based on chemical, biological, neurological and directed-energy 
mechanisms. Such weapons have been designed with mass 
incapacitation in mind and could have a tactical role when used 
for border protection against refugees, protesters at rallies, and 
any massed assembly. Some of these are aimed at area denial 
and use a targeting method that is both indiscriminate and 
victim-activated.  
     Our aim here is to explain some of the new technologies for 
social control and to give ideas about how they might be 
opposed. Because few of these technologies have been 
implemented, with some scarcely past the drawing board, our 
assessments are inevitably preliminary and speculative. Our aim 
here is not to predict the future but rather to warn about current 
trends and to suggest ways of carrying out technical and social 
analyses that can help those opposed to technological assault. 
We also want to draw attention to the ethics of some of the 
possible countermeasures to such technologies, when 
attempting to advance social justice in a time of terror.  
4. Arsenals and Scenarios  
The term 'non-lethal weapon' is often a misnomer, because 
people can be killed as well as permanently disabled by these 
weapons. This can occur when weapons are used contrary to 
specifications, such as plastic bullets fired at close range, or 
when the target is vulnerable, such as electroshock used against 
a person with a weak heart. Sometimes 'less-lethal weapon' or 
'sub-lethal weapon' is used to indicate the ambiguity. However, 
because of their nature, many of these weapons can be 
deliberately abused to inflict torture or force compliance via 
pain (Amnesty 2003). Many of the technologies being developed 
for area denial or exclusion purposes have never been subjected 
to independent medical evaluation. It is worth mentioning some 
of the varieties of weapons to illustrate the medical uncertainties 
surrounding their alleged harmlessness (Wright 2002).  
     There are a number of new mechanisms for such weapons 
currently being explored, including taser anti-personnel mines; 
high-powered microwaves; armed robots; wireless tasers; 
acoustic devices/vortex rings; ionizing and pulsed energy lasers; 
chemical calmatives, convulsants, bioregulators and 
malodurants.  
Some of this technology is so alien that the best way to imagine 
how it will be used is via imaginative devices such as science 
fiction stories or possible-use scenarios. In the future, science 
fiction and Hollywood can probably provide some of the most 
powerful warnings about the need for adequate social impact or 
technology assessment of such devices.  
With a much more modest budget it is more appropriate for us 
to provide illustrative technological scenarios. We use taser 
landmines as our primary example, giving an overview of the 
technology and its likely applications and then suggesting some 
possible technical countermeasures, namely ways that targets of 
the weapons might avoid or neutralize them. We then suggest 
some more generally applicable political countermeasures, 
namely ways for targets or opponents of the weapons to 
challenge taser landmines, at the point of use or earlier during 
production, sale or implementation. We are also mindful of the 
potential future role of support networks that may be better 
equipped than the immediate targets, lending their energy and 
external resources to providing bridges out from areas otherwise 
technologically denied. In a later section we introduce a number 
of other scenarios and possible technical countermeasures.  
5. Taser Landmines  
A taser is an electroshock weapon. It delivers a high voltage, 
typically 50,000 volts, to the target, resulting in excruciating 
pain and a shutdown of major muscle groups, causing physical 
collapse. A typical weapon used in policing fires two darts at the 
target, with trailing wires. Once an electrical connection is 
made, the voltage is turned on, disabling the target even 
through clothing.  
     The taser is supposed to be non-lethal, causing no permanent 
damage, but there have been reported cases of deaths and 
miscarriages linked to taser use, though causation has been 
contested by police.   A recent report by Amnesty International 
alleges that there have been over 70 deaths attributable to taser 
use in the US and Canada (Amnesty 2004). What is undoubted 
is the extreme pain caused by tasers. When a group of 
volunteers experienced the effect of a taser, only one was willing 
to accept exposure for the full five seconds before the voltage 
was automatically cut off, and not a single one volunteered for a 
second shock (Rappert 2003).  
     The idea of the taser landmine is to arm a landmine not with 
an explosive but with a taser. A person triggering the mine 
would be hit by the taser darts and immobilized. The taser 
would give regular shocks over an extended period, up to an 
hour.  
     A field of taser landmines could serve as a form of non-lethal 
border protection. An area would be mined; a few guards would 
be available to arrest or release victims of the mines.  
     Given the high level of pain caused by even a few seconds of 
taser shocks, the consequences of many minutes of shock are 
truly horrific, and would likely result in post-traumatic stress 
disorder if not worse.  
5.1 Technological Countermeasures  
As with any minefield, an obvious countermeasure is avoidance, 
namely getting through the field without triggering any mines. 
But the risks are so great that this seems unwise. Another option 
is triggering mines by tossing objects into the field, by using 
long non-conducting probes (such as wooden poles), or by 
sending an automatic vehicle into the area. Another approach is 
protection, for example a large shield surrounding the body, 
separated by insulation. Riding in a car would easily provide 
protection - but not in difficult terrain. It is also possible to 
imagine electromagnetic countermeasures designed to disrupt 
taser electronics. These are likely to be far too advanced for 
most refugees to contemplate initially. But there will be a 
learning curve as refugees find out about the technology and try 
out crude measures to resist or avoid it. Later, sympathetic 
NGOs might be able to provide both information and practical 
assistance in creating mechanisms to disable the mines or to 
drive vehicles into the mined areas that can produce safe 
bridges once all the existing ordnance has been triggered. 
Testing might indicate for example that devices as simple as a 
pulsed water pistol are sufficient to trigger the device; modern 
toys have quite high ranges and include substantial reservoirs. 
Or more simply, a large sports utility vehicle (SUV) or landrover 
could be driven from the other side and spray paint used on the 
ground to mark a safe route. Even relatively simple devices such 
as a lawn mower with fixed wheels could be adapted and let 
loose if the terrain was smooth. Another option is the use of 
animals, such as sheep or goats, that could be herded through a 
minefield to create a safe path for humans, though at the cost of 
hurting the animals.  
6. Political Countermeasures  
One of the attractions of non-lethal weapons, from the point of 
view of their promoters, is that they have a more benign 
appearance and are thus less likely to cause concern than old-
fashioned lethal weapons such as guns. If refugees were shot 
down in cold blood at borders, this could cause outrage, but if 
they were deterred by chemical or electrical techniques, outrage 
might be reduced.  
     Torture is almost always carried out in secret, because it is 
widely seen as reprehensible. However, torture carried out using 
sensory deprivation may be presented as not quite so bad as a 
brutal beating, though it can be just as damaging. We therefore 
are interested in ways that defenders of human rights can 
ensure that appropriate outrage results from illegal use of non-
lethal weapons. To provide a framework for analysing political 
countermeasures, we use the theory of backfire dynamics 
(Jansen and Martin 2003, 2004; Martin 2004, 2005; Martin 
and Wright 2003).  
     If an action is perceived as unjust and information about it is 
communicated to receptive audiences, it has the capacity to 
backfire against those held responsible. For example, a cold-
blooded massacre of peaceful protesters can backfire against the 
killers or the government held responsible (Sharp 1973). 
Prominent examples include the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in 
South Africa, which greatly stimulated international opposition 
to apartheid, and the 1991 Dili massacre in East Timor, which 
led to a huge increase in international support for East Timorese 
independence.  
     Attackers have several ways to inhibit this backfire process: 
(1) cover-up; (2) devaluation of the targets; (3) reinterpretation 
of what is happening; (4) use of official processes to give the 
appearance of justice; and (5) intimidation and bribery.  
     These five methods are commonly used when asylum seekers 
are held in detention camps, in order to prevent outrage from 
this inhumane treatment. For example, in Australia (Callaghan 
and Martin 2004), (1) many detention camps are far from 
population centres and kept off limits to the media, to prevent 
the general public knowing the damage caused to inmates. (2) 
Refugees are demonized as threats to the integrity of the nation, 
as self-seeking, as inferior, and as terrorists. (3) Use of 
detention camps is said to be about border protection, not about 
denial of human rights. (4) Appeal procedures for refugees give 
the appearance of justice and thereby reduce immediate 
outrage, but in practice, due to cost, slowness and procedural 
complexity, perpetuate the detention process. (5) Detention 
itself is a form of intimidation. Protest against detention can be 
met by deportation or by bureaucratic reprisals such as denial of 
family reunions.  
     To oppose injustice, each of these five methods needs to be 
countered. (1) The obvious way to counter cover-up is through 
exposure, for example through films of conditions in detention 
camps. (2) The best way to counter devaluation is to humanize 
refugees, for example through personal profiles of individuals. 
(3) To counter official defences of refugee policy, the 
significance of human rights needs to be continually 
emphasized. (4) For opponents of refugee policies, it is tempting 
to pursue legal or procedural paths such as court challenges to 
the treatment of individual refugees. The danger is that this may 
chew up large amounts of money and energy and take a very 
long time while policies create ever more victims. Procedural 
routes, if pursued, need to be combined with publicity in order 
to maximize public outrage. (5) There are two main ways to 
counter intimidation. One is to refuse to be intimidated. The 
other is to expose the intimidation itself. This applies not just to 
refugees but also to others. For example, journalists and editors 
can go ahead and publish stories despite legal threats, and 
expose the threats in order to discredit them.  
     International solidarity movements are also important in 
reminding perpetrators of human rights violations that they can 
and will be held accountable for their actions. Persistence is 
crucial though often difficult. In 2004, something occurred that 
previously would have hardly seemed believable: 27,000 
Chilean victims of torture during the dirty wars from 1973-1992 
(under the internationally supported Pinochet regime) were 
granted lifetime pensions (Gallardo 2004).  
To illustrate how the backfire approach can be used, we examine 
the scenario of taser landmines, looking in turn at each of the 
five methods of amplifying outrage.  
     (1) The horrifying consequences of taser landmines need to 
be exposed, if possible well in advance by explaining the human 
effects of long-term exposure to tasers. Should an actual taser 
minefield be constructed, the visual effect is not likely to be 
striking: photos would not be dramatic, even of a person 
trapped by a taser. More useful would be confidential reports of 
the effects of long-term taser exposure or personal testimony of 
these effects.  
     (2) Before venturing into a field of taser landmines, it would 
be useful to carry out personal interviews with refugees, 
combined with photos. With computers and digital cameras, 
this could be carried out on the spot and communicated to wider 
audiences. This would bring refugees to life as 'real people' 
rather than faceless intruders.  
     (3) Proponents will paint taser landmines as a legitimate, 
non-lethal technique to prevent unauthorized border crossings. 
Opponents need to present counterarguments, including the 
extremely damaging effects of long-term exposure to tasers, as 
well as more general arguments about human rights.  
     (4) Legal or procedural paths, such as seeking a legal ban on 
the technology or on sales to particular regimes, can be useful 
especially if used as a tool to create awareness and concern. It 
would be unwise to rely entirely on formal channels, because 
laws and regulations are too easily delayed, eviscerated, 
circumvented or overturned. For example, the taser mine itself 
is cynically designed to be compliant with the Ottawa Treaty 
against landmines. Future campaigners need to continue to 
examine the way these mines are actually used, because they 
may actually violate the treaty once deployed.  
     (5) Those seeking to expose the inhumane nature of the 
mines, by collecting and publishing information, need to stand 
up to threats and legal actions and not succumb to the 
temptation of accepting funding from organizations that expect 
recipients not to rock the boat.  
It is important to remember that backfire only occurs when 
there is a perceived injustice, often linked to unfairness, 
disproportionality or norm violation. When peaceful protesters 
are violently attacked, this is commonly perceived as unjust 
because the protesters did nothing to deserve the severity of the 
attack. But if even a few protesters fight back, this can change 
the situation to one perceived as a confrontation with violence 
on both sides, and for many observers outrage is likely to be 
reduced even though there is still a disproportionality in the use 
of violence.  
     Similarly, if refugees are seen as victims of a brutal 
technology - taser landmines in this case - then they are likely to 
be viewed sympathetically. But if the refugees or their 
supporters are seen as being aggressive, for example by blowing 
up landmines, then some of this sympathy may be lost. 
Therefore, in looking at technological countermeasures, it is 
important to keep in mind the image presented to observers. 
Nonthreatening, defensive methods are likely to be viewed more 
favourably than violent aggressive ones.  
7. Other Area Denial Scenarios  
7.1 High-powered Microwaves  
This device enables a pencil beam of microwave radiation to be 
focused on a human body at some distance. The result is near 
instant pain that can only be alleviated by moving out of the 
beam's path. Such weapons pose all the hazards associated with 
microwave radiation, with the eyes being particularly vulnerable 
to a cooking effect. The pain induced is meant to make the dose 
self-limiting but much higher exposure would become likely if 
lethal force or barriers blocked off escape routes. The official 
line is that the devices are safe, though no official technical data 
has been released. A November 2004 conference at Bradford 
University on non-lethal weapons questioned the assumption of 
safety. A participant observed that a natural response to intense 
eye pain is to shut the eyes - hence making targets effectively 
blind so that they could no longer navigate a safe way out. 
Another expert said as far as he knew there was no automatic 
cut-off   on the device which would close it down once a human 
reached a disabling temperature. Such blind targets would 
microwave cook en masse. An effective challenge to the 
apologists for such weapons is to advocate transparency and 
legal accountability. We will need to establish ways to control or 
oppose such innovations or face the prospect of successive 
generations of refugees and activists being the guinea pigs for 
each successive newcomer to the growing arsenal of 
unconventional disabling weapons.  
At the time of writing this device is a mobile platform but it is 
not difficult to imagine such technologies being deployed at 
borders in roving beam fashion. It has been reported that these 
devices would be deployed in 2005, probably in Iraq (Lococo 
2004).  
The obvious countermeasures include either physical 
destruction of the device via some form of disruption, including 
rocks, or to mirror the beam back to source. The danger of such 
resistance is that it is likely to provoke the deployment of more 
lethal technology. A more defensive technology might be to set 
up a water curtain spray (if water is readily available), because 
this would dissipate the directed energy into the water as heat. 
For individuals, aluminium foil blankets and mirror sunglasses 
afford some protection and could be used on vehicles too. A 
high-tech form of countermeasure might be the use of 
'microwave bridges' to redirect the radiation back to source. 
However whilst such techno-jiu-jitsu devices are appealing in 
principle, without the ability for proper field-testing they are 
likely to remain the domain of government-funded 
countermeasure programmes that are already investigating how 
to overcome such border control devices.  
7.2 Armed Robots  
Armed robots are algorithmic self-deciding intelligent mobile 
devices armed with either lethal or sub-lethal weapons and 
capable of operating as border patrol agents. What was once 
science fiction is now a reality. Robots bearing incapacitating 
technologies are now marketed as programmable sentinels of 
organized violence that will work without respite. The potential 
hazards are those associated with weapons operating without 
finer points of discrimination or being deliberately deployed in 
an abusive configuration especially when on automatic mode 
and hunting in packs.  
Isaac Asimov's science fiction was predicated on rules that no 
robot should ever be programmed to harm a human being. That 
design criterion remains fictional: these devices have the 
potential to be a form of ruthless border patrol that can make 
rottweilers passé. Unlike rottweilers, such 'self-deciding 
vehicles' will not be able to be lured off with a juicy piece of 
steak. However, all such devices must be mobile and their patrol 
route governed by terrain. Like fictional Daleks, old robots could 
not go up stairs or negotiate steep hills or holes, so setting up 
suitable obstacles would enable robot-free bridges to be 
temporarily secured. New robots, such as the Foster-Miller 
armed military robots, planned for deployment in Iraq in 2005, 
can walk up stairs (Anon 2005). (Foster-Miller is a subsidiary of 
QinetiQ, a company in the Carlisle group, which is heavily 
involved in oil exploration.) Unlike humans, such robots 
generate neither letters of condolence to grieving parents nor 
are they ever likely to be court-martialled for killing an unarmed 
civilian.  
To deal with armed robots, opponents can use tools to tip them 
over. Most such devices are vulnerable to fire: already the web 
provides instructions on using mixtures of petrol, soap flakes 
and polystyrene that would be sufficient to napalm them out of 
kilter but it is likely that other members of the robot gang will be 
pre-programmed to report such attacks and request 
reinforcements. Less violent approaches involving minimum 
equipment include netting to immobilize robots and black spray 
paint if a robot is dependent on electronic camera vision for 
orientation. However, aerial robots may be harder to resist, 
especially if they are designed to spray calmatives or project 
other paralysing and incapacitating systems on to crowds. As yet 
UAVs - unmanned aerial vehicles - are very expensive but that 
may change. In such circumstances, their Achilles heel is the 
telecommunications link, which could be targeted with a simple 
microwave weapon based on a car-battery powered device using 
a microwave oven and satellite dish.  
7.3 Wireless Tasers  
These devices work by spraying plasma from a water cannon 
device: in essence, conductive liquid spray allows electrical-
energy-inducing equipment to transfer the shock to the crowd. 
This technology is being actively researched in Germany and 
Russia and depends on relatively calm conditions (Fortov et al. 
2003; Meisterhans 2003). Countermeasures could be focussed 
at either diverting the stream of plasma or earthing the flow of 
electricity with a physical metal-covered barrier. If it was a static 
location then using a car-battery-powered set of fans might be 
sufficient to divert the flow off target. Physical pre-assembled 
foil-covered shields might be just as useful in cutting off the 
flow.  
Alternatively, if any mains source is available, a counterblast 
could be attempted by rubber-gloved activists since the plasma 
will conduct power both ways and it seems unlikely that the 
device would be built to run on other than grid electricity. A 
more daring way of achieving this aim would be rocket powered 
hooks with metal lines used as marine life saving equipment 
but, if such devices are in short supply, other earthing devices 
using coiled wire might be attempted. Indeed, hundreds of 
commercially available helium-filled foil balloons might serve 
admirably or, if helium was unavailable, the more flammable 
natural gas could be used.  
7.4 Acoustic Devices/Vortex Ring  
Acoustic devices can cause disorientation by producing very 
loud noises. Infra-sound can be created using two ultrasound 
beams. Pyrotechnically generated sound rings can create either 
knock-down effects at a distance or carry other incapacitating 
agents. However, critics doubt the viability of some acoustic 
weapons, since permanent damage to the ear is possible. Vortex 
ring technology is still at the prototype stage but blunt trauma 
injuries are likely to be similar to those associated with water 
cannon (Deiming et al. 2001).  
7.5 Ionizing and Pulsed Energy Lasers  
Laser light in the UV spectrum can ionize the air sufficiently for 
it to conduct high voltage electricity, thus making possible 
directed energy weapons. Their hazards are essentially those 
associated with electroshocking a diverse population including 
susceptibility to stress-induced heart attacks, pacemaker failure 
and induction of post traumatic stress. A new variant has 
recently been reported from the US Joint Non Lethal Weapons 
Directorate, namely the pulsed energy projectile that is 
scheduled to hit the streets by 2006. It started life as the 'Pulsed 
Impulsive Kill Laser' but has been retuned to create a shock 
wave by vapourizing the first thing it hits (Hambling 2002, 
2004). Its technical specifications have been well guarded but 
some superfluous injury and traumatic shock induction seem 
likely. At this stage, the most effective countermeasures revolve 
around challenging the inhumane nature of using a weapon 
whose physiological effects on a mixed audience cannot be 
known in advance.  
7.6 Chemical Calmatives, Convulsants, Bio-regulators 
and Malodurants  
A wide range of chemicals that create a paralyzing effect can be 
delivered to targets by existing mechanisms for delivering 
chemical or malodorous agents. Bioregulators would be targeted 
at interfering with body functions that maintain steady body 
temperature, heart rate, breathing and heart rates, etc. 
However, one person's tranquillization is another's lethal dose. 
In field circumstances, it is impossible to guarantee a uniform 
effect. Further advances in molecular biology are being directed 
at specific receptor sites in the human brain that can induce fear 
and anxiety. These breakthroughs create capacities that no 
government has ever been shown to use responsibly. The 
developments pose a huge challenge to NGOs wishing to avoid 
an arms race in the life sciences (Dando and Nathanson 2004). 
Yet the strongest objection to their future development remains 
the fact that they are illegal in most plausible scenarios of future 
use; this offers a strong campaigning platform.  
8. Conclusion  
The introduction of border control using methods such as taser 
landmines, armed robots or high-powered microwaves is a 
frightful prospect, given the physical, emotional and social 
damage that would ensue. We hope that none of these scenarios 
is actually played out, but feel it necessary to explore the 
possibility in order to raise concern. We assume that refugees, 
activists and others will continue to face new technologies in the 
arsenals of states determined to go beyond the limits of morality 
and the law. The ethical question for activists during such times, 
as ever, is what choices should be made if we are to sustain a 
role as human rights defenders?  
In outlining scenarios, we have mentioned some technological 
countermeasures. We also outlined political countermeasures to 
taser landmines, noting that similar political countermeasures 
would apply to the other scenarios. We know that some of these 
activities will in themselves invite legal and possibly police and 
military challenge. Our assessments are intended to stimulate 
thinking about possibilities rather than provide definitive 
answers.  
The nightmare scenario is that such area denial technologies are 
imposed in a mechanistic manner that isolates large numbers of 
people desperately fleeing disaster and conflict. The dilemma 
then for those determined to engage in humanitarian action is 
what can and should be done to counter such technologies. 
Much depends on how much preparation time there is and what 
values are being defended. We believe that activists need to 
address the unpalatable truth of the emergence of technologies 
specifically designed to undermine current nonviolent 
strategies. Technological countermeasures are only part of the 
solution to human rights abuses due to border control 
technologies. The challenge is to design effective and humane 
countermeasures that do not invite a more violent response. We 
encourage others to replicate and innovate means of 
technological and political resistance and maintain a focus on 
the central issues of human rights.    
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